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THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PERSPECTIVE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR-PATENTS
Peter C. Richardson*
I want to elaborate on specific problems faced by the pharmaceu-
tical industry, particularly with respect to patents, and on why im-
provements in patent protection are of particular importance to us.
To put things into perspective, Pfizer is a U.S.-based research-based
health care company with principal product lines in pharmaceuticals,
medical devices and specialty chemicals. Pfizer operates in over 140
countries, has manufacturing facilities in 65 countries and approxi-
mately 50 percent of our sales come from markets outside the United
States. While my remarks are from the pharmaceutical industry's
perspective, they are common to other sectors of industry, particularly
agricultural chemicals and also to research-based high-tech industries
in the United States.
Studies have shown that the pharmaceutical industry is by far the
industry most dependent on patent protection. To understand why,
it is helpful to know that in 1987 Pfizer spent over $400 million on
research and development, which was over eight percent of our net
sales. This is typical of our industry but significantly higher than
that of industry generally in the United States. Estimates are that
today it costs $125 million and about 10 years or more from the
time a new pharmaceutical product is discovered in the laboratory
to the time it is brought to the market. Of every ten to fifteen
thousand new compounds that are made in the laboratory, only one
of these compounds will be developed into a commercial product.
Many compounds will fall by the wayside even in the late stages of
clinical trials. To bring a new product to the market involves enormous
resources and people with diverse expertise and there are significant
regulatory requirements for market entry. If a company is expected
to continue to invest such time and money and to undertake the risk
of development of new drugs, then it is critical that it enjoy at least
some reasonable period of exclusive use of the few successful products
that come out of its R&D efforts, as was intended by patent laws.
The theory of patent law is that in return for the disclosure of
the invention to the public, the innovator receives a limited period
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of exclusivity during which he can recoup his investment in research
and development. In many countries, however, the patent laws are
inadequate either in the protection afforded or the enforcement of
those laws. In some countries they are non-existent, where the pirate
companies can freely enter the market and often take over significant
shares of the market. In some instances, the copied product will
appear in the foreign market before we can even market our own
product. Such pirate companies pay none of the costs of the research
and development, but wait until we have spent the money and then
pick off our most successful products. Obviously they can always
undercut us in price because they do not need to factor the enormous
R&D cost into their market price.
In connection with exclusivity, it is worth mentioning that people
like to talk about the "monopoly" that is provided by the patent.
Bear in mind that it is not a true monopoly because a pharmaceutical
product rarely, if ever, is the only product in the particular market.
For example, one of our major products is an antiarthritic drug.
There are about one hundred antiarthritic drugs, some patented, and
many unpatented. Therefore, we cannot charge any price that we
like and expect to dominate the market through the sale of one drug.
In other words, there are significant market forces that prevent a
monopoly position in any one product.
In the United States, Japan and Europe there are good patent laws
that generally provide adequate protection for our industry. Con-
versely, in many developing countries there are inadequate degrees
of protection. Looking at those countries, they can be categorized
in the following ways:
First, there are countries with no patent laws at all, such as In-
donesia (which just drafted a patent law that is under review) and
Turkey. Next, some countries have laws that provide that certain
classes of subject matter cannot be patented; pharmaceuticals are
often among those excluded. An example of such a country is Brazil.
A more widespread form of inadequacy exists where countries provide
only process patent protection, as opposed to product patent pro-
tection for the compound itself. A product patent gives the owner
the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the compound
regardless of how it is made. A process patent only protects that
specific method of manufacture, and it is always possible to find
alternative methods of making a compound once the innovator has
disclosed his invention and demonstrated the valuable properties of
the compound.
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There are also significant difficulties in enforcing a process patent
because there is no way of knowing how the infringer is in fact
making the product. One cannot go inside his plant to inspect to
find the process. The patentee usually has the burden of proving
infringement and most countries have no discovery procedures whereby
you can determine how the manufacturer is making your product.
A further deficiency, which is common, is an inadequate term of
protection. India is a prime example of a country presenting this
problem. India provides only process patents for pharmaceuticals,
and the term of the patent is only five years. As I indicated earlier,
it usually takes us ten years to bring such a product to market. A
patent that expires five years before we can bring the product to
market is of very little assistance to us.
In the United States the term of a patent is seventeen years from
grant, while in Europe it is twenty years from the date of filing the
patent application. These terms are generally considered to be a
normal standard which we would accept for the term of the patent.
We do not, however, enjoy a twenty-year period of marketing ex-
clusivity. The patent application is necessarily filed soon after the
time the compound is initially discovered in research, and it takes
us ten years to develop the product to the point where we can bring
it to the market. Typically we end up with a period from five to ten
years left on the patent life, significantly less than in other fields of
technology. This has been recognized in the United States and Japan,
for example, by provisions for patent term restoration which are
designed to compensate for periods lost in regulatory review. Similar
provisions are under consideration in Europe.
A further problem is unreasonable compulsory licensing or lapse
provisions. Typically the laws in many countries require, as authorized
by the Paris Convention, that a patent be worked locally within three
years from grant. In other words you have to manufacture the bulk
drug in each and every country where you have a patent, within
three years from the time the patent is granted. As I have indicated
before, that is impossible for us to do because it takes us ten years
before we are in a position to manufacture and market that product.
Economic realities also make it impossible for us to work in every
country. While we have manufacturing facilities in sixty-five countries,
we cannot make bulk drugs in all of those. We can only make bulk
drugs in a few centralized facilities. Many pharmaceuticals contain
only ten milligrams of active drug in a tablet or a pill and a few
hundred kilos of the active drug are enough to satisfy the worldwide
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demand. You cannot split that up into manufacturing facilities in
every country in which you plan to market.
The last deficiency is in the enforcement area. Obviously any patent
is of no use if there is not an adequate judicial system that will
enforce that patent for you. We have litigation in countries like Spain
that afford process patent protection where the suit typically goes on
for ten or more years, during which time the generic manufacturer
continues to sell in the market. Until very recently there have been
no provisions in Spanish law whereby preliminary injunctions can be
granted. The slow and tedious nature of Spanish litigation is typical
of many countries, where litigation goes on forever. It is an exercise
in frustration to try to enforce your patent rights.
The Paris Convention, which is the principal international treaty
concerning patents, contains no standards of protection for the issues
I have discussed. There is nothing concerning the term of the patent.
There is nothing concerning protection of any specific subject matter,
whether by a product or process patent. There are provisions relating
to compulsory licensing, but as I have indicated those criteria are
unrealistic in the commercial world that we face today. The principal
requirement of the Paris Convention is national treatment, but the
fact that Brazil, for example, does not give it own citizens adequate
protection of patents for pharmaceuticals is of no consolation to us
when we are denied protection for our products.
The GATT offers what we see as a preferred opportunity for
addressing the problems in a multilateral agreement. The concept is
that there would be a code of minimum standards of substantive
levels of protection which would be a floor level above which the
laws of all signatories would have to rise in order to be in accord
with the treaty. For patents, then, the code would include a require-
ment that product patents be granted for all classes of subject matter
without discrimination. It would provide an adequate term which we
would consider to be twenty years from filing. It would have to place
some reasonable, realistic criteria for compulsory licenses.
It is worth emphasizing that what is proposed is a code of minimum
standards. As such, it stands or falls in total. You cannot provide
half of a product patent. You cannot say, "I will give you a product
patent but I will only give you half the term you want"-or "I will
give you a product patent but I will take it away from you by
unrealistic compulsory license provisions." From our perspective, a
watered down code which would result from negotiations trying to
satisfy the competing needs of large numbers of countries to get them
to sign the code would be of no value. Our perception would then
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be that if you cannot achieve it in the GATT, we should achieve it
outside the GATT. This means that there would be more bilateral
actions of the type that have been described earlier.
In the short term we expect that there will be bilateral actions and
that major benefits can come from such actions in the short term.
Our hope is that the GATT will proceed quickly and that our long-
term problems will be resolved through the GATT.
In terms of transition provisions, I must point out that if a country
were to change its laws tomorrow to provide adequate protection (let
us say it provides product patent protection for the first time and I
have a compound newly discovered in the lab and I file for a product
patent the day after the new law goes into effect), it will be ten years
before that compound is marketed. We are talking about a market
effect of these changes in the early 2000s.
There are benefits to the developing countries. It may be argued
that there are some disadvantages of somebody having exclusive rights
to a particular compound, but those should be offset in the longer
term by stimulation of innovation in the country. Without such
protection, U.S. companies are reluctant to invest in developing coun-
tries and to transfer technology to those countries, for fear it will
be lost and taken over by others.
Local inventors will find out that they will have their inventions
stolen just the same as U.S. inventors are finding in the foreign
markets. A good example is in the bio-tech area where there is very
little required in initial investment to get started. Many developing
countries have good scientists and expertise in these areas and have
the basis for having a good industry. Those people are going to want
to protect their own inventions but will find that they are unable to
do so. Developing countries are going to realize that it is in their
own interest to provide that protection to their industries.
The patent laws are designed to stimulate innovation. They should
not be used to solve every social problem that one can associate with
the use of pharmaceuticals. There are difficult issues involved in the
pharmaceutical area. Every government has its rules and regulations
which relate to the approval and marketing of drugs. It is not ap-
propriate to graft those concerns into a patent law. The patent laws
should be left to the purpose for which they were intended.
To complete the picture, the pharmaceutical industry also has
interests in similar improvements in trademark, copyright and trade
secret protection, particularly with respect to the recognition of the
proprietary nature of data that is submitted to the regulatory au-
thorities. It takes enormous amounts of time, effort and money to
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develop the clinical trial and other data that are necessary to establish
the safety and efficacy of a drug. That data should be used for the
benefit of the innovator alone for at least a reasonable amount of
time and should not be made available to generic competitors. In
some countries, competitors have free access to the innovator's data
and need to submit no clinical data or studies of their own. All of
these are areas that are being considered in the GATT and in some
bilaterals. We hope that these efforts will result in improvement,
hopefully in the short term.
